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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines the far left party family and its voters across Europe to fill a gap 
in the literature. It addresses the question of where far left parties and their voters occupy the 
ideological space on the left. The paper analyzes the choices offered by the far left party family 
in Western and Eastern Europe and studies to what extend far left parties match their voters‟ 
preferences. By using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project and the European Value 
Survey, I demonstrate that the far left party family and its voters can be clearly distinguished 
from the other competitors on the left in Western Europe. The demarcations are more blurred in 
the East with a great deal of issue overlap.  
Moreover, while the same issues of the far left party family in Western Europe are important to 
its voters, no such overlap is present in the East. Though far left voters can be found furthest to 
the left on the ideological scale, their respective party family is closer to the center with the 
social democratic parties filling the void on the far left. Clearly the political choices offered by 
far left parties in the East are not effective since they do not follow their voters‟ preferences, 
which has implications for the democratic process in the region.  
Parties are thought to be fundamental for democracy in Europe. They express the ideological 
preferences of citizens and convert them into public policy, thus representing their electorate, 
and they are vital for defining the choices available to their voters. When no meaningful choices 
are offered by parties, indifference or alienation can be the result. If there is no political entity 
such as parties to openly discuss, support and pursue these issues, voters have a more difficult 
time to develop their own far left positions. After all, it is the parties function to express and 
offer choices. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Parties are largely understood to form the basis of democracy (Dalton & Wattenberg 
2000, p. 3). Starting with E. E. Schattschneider who concluded that “modern democracy is 
unthinkable save in terms of political parties” (1942, p. 1), parties have come to be understood as 
a vital part of democratic governments, especially in Europe (Mair & Thomassen 2010; Dalton 
2006). Most importantly, they express the ideological preferences of citizens and convert them 
into public policy (Ezrow 2010, Pennings & Keman 2002). Hence, it is self-evident “that the 
process of political representation in contemporary democracies requires the involvement of 
political parties” (Mair & Thomassen 2010, p. 23). And in reference to Europe, “parties are the 
primary institutions of representative democracy” (Dalton 2006, p. 127). Moreover, since most 
voters in Europe elect party representatives rather than individual candidates, it is parties that 
“define the choices available for voters” (Dalton 2006, p. 127). In order for parties to actually 
represent citizens, however, these choices need to be meaningful (Wessels & Schmitt 2008; 
Dalton 2006). 
When no meaningful choices are offered by parties – either because of the lack of 
difference between alternatives or the differences exist but alternatives are too far away from 
voters‟ preferences – indifference or alienation can be the result (Wessels & Schmitt 2008) and 
parties‟ representation of citizens‟ preferences is no longer guaranteed.  
While there have been numerous (cross-country) studies published on the influence of the 
party system, institutions, electoral rules, different party and voter types on the choices available 
and the degree of representation
1
, the present work focuses on an understudied subject within 
that research area. The paper examines one specific party family and its voters which have been 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Duverger 1954, Downs 1957, Sartori 1976; Dalton 1985; Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; 
Klingemann et al 2006; Dalton 2006; Powell 2009; Ezrow 2010.  
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mostly neglected or ignored in the literature: the far left. It analyzes the choices offered by the far 
left party family in Western and Eastern Europe and studies to what extend far left parties 
represent their voters‟ preferences.  
Several European countries, among them France, Germany and the Netherlands, have 
witnessed the rise of far left parties in recent years. In fact, a total of 19 European countries have 
far left parties that received votes in the most recent election, ranging from less than 1 percent in 
England and Switzerland to double digit results in Germany, Iceland and Moldova.
2
 
Interestingly, the phenomenon of far left parties has mainly been noted in the context of country, 
party-specific or regional studies. On a large scale, hardly any research has been done on 
European far left parties as a “family”. Also, virtually nothing is known about the party voters in 
a cross-country perspective, especially with regards to quantitative analysis.     
 In the few studies published, there seems to be a consensus in the literature that far left 
(or communist) parties
3
 across Europe can be characterized by their economic policy stances. 
They are in opposition to capitalism and instead favor a heavily regulated economy as well as a 
wide ranging welfare system. Far left parties and their voters have also been connected to 
attitudes unfavorable to immigration. These anti-capitalist and anti-integration stances are in 
opposition to what the European Union represents and therefore could possibly undermine the 
liberal democratic bases of European countries – giving just one reason why far left parties and 
their voters should be studied more intensely. At the same time, research also shows that parties 
                                                          
2
 See appendix A for a detailed list. 
3
 Throughout the paper I will use the terms “communist” and “far left” interchangeably in order to refer to political 
parties on the far left of the ideological scale. This is not to purposefully confuse the reader but because “communist 
parties” is an ambiguous label and not always fitting. For example, the Party Manifestos Project combined far left 
parties in the party family category “communist parties”. However, this group includes many socialist parties such 
as the former German Party of Democratic Socialism (now called simply “the Left”) or the Socialist Workers Party 
of Spain and the Socialist Party in Portugal. While I would prefer to exclusively use the term “far left” instead, I will 
use “communist parties” in order to reference the Party Manifestos Project category.       
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in general have undergone a great diversification since 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, which possibly has resulted in distinct differences between communist parties in Western 
and Eastern Europe that are worth examining (Bull 1995; Hough 2005, Ishiyama 1995). 
 While the single country studies and the descriptions of historical and regional 
developments are rich in detail they have one flaw: they lack empirical evidence. None of the 
authors cited below provides a clear answer to the question of where exactly far left parties and 
their voters occupy the ideological space on the left. What choices are offered by the communist 
party family? Are economic policy stances really a good measure for defining this party family? 
Furthermore, how well do far left parties and their voters match in their attitudes and policy 
preferences? Do parties accurately represent the electorate on the far left?  What are the specific 
differences between Eastern and Western Europe? In addition, by considering two levels or units 
of analysis simultaneously – parties and their voters at a specific point in time – this study 
reveals more about the relationship between the two with respect to available choices and 
representation.   
 This paper tries to answer the above raised questions by empirically analyzing two 
existing datasets – the Comparative Manifestos Project
4
 and the European Value Survey – with 
respect to far left parties‟ policy stances, specifically concerning left-right, the economy and 
questions of European integration, and voter‟s matching attitudes in Eastern and Western 
Europe. While domestic economic issues dominate the discussion in the literature (Mudde 2009) 
and thus are the obvious choice for the analysis, I also included a variable addressing an 
international topic to expand the framework of the study. I expect results for economically based 
questions to be clearer than those on the integration process of the European Union.   
                                                          
4
 The chapter on the Comparative Manifestos Project will discuss in detail why party manifestos were chosen for the 
analysis rather than expert surveys. 
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The remaining text is organized into two larger parts. Part one addresses the question of 
choice among far left parties. In the first section, existing comparative accounts of far left parties 
are critically reviewed and it is shown how they are inadequate to answer the questions. Though 
there is a consensus in the literature on far left parties‟ economic position no empirical evidence 
exists. I make the argument that a synchronic analysis
5
 is best suited to determine the ideology 
and policy stances of far left parties in Europe when used in connection with a statistical model. 
A synchronic analysis tests the differences on a particular topic – far left parties and their voters 
in the case of the present study – between countries at one point in time. Rather than looking 
back to when far left parties first emerged and track their changes, this paper explores the 
contemporary far left electorate and its relationship to the far left party family in West and East 
Europe.  
The following section uses data from the Party Manifestos Project in order to examine the 
distribution of European far left parties on the left-right scale and with respect to their policy 
stances on planned and market economy, welfare and European integration. I find that the 
communist party family can be clearly distinguished from the social democrats (and the greens) 
on the left side of the ideological spectrum (though not always in the expected way)
6
. However, 
boundaries are less clear with regards to the programmatic variables themselves, thus providing 
evidence for a reduced choice-set. Especially in Eastern Europe the demarcation between 
communist and social democratic parties with respect to planned economy, market economy and 
welfare are blurred because both types of parties often supply similar choices to voters. This in 
turn has implications for the choices available to voters in that region. Faced with less 
                                                          
5
 As identified by Mair and Mudde (1998). 
6
 The social democratic party family is actually further to the left than the “far” left party family in Eastern Europe. 
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distinguishable alternatives East European voters might feel alienated and turn away from the 
democratic process of elections or chose social democratic parties over communist ones.           
The second part explores the conclusions drawn in the previous sections with respect to 
far left voters and expands on them theoretically as well as examines the degree of representation 
between parties and the electorate. In addition to their placement on the left-right ideological 
scale, it addresses why voters of far left parties might exhibit economic insecurity and opposition 
to a further EU integration, drawing parallels to the issues already explored in the section on the 
far left party family.  
This is followed by the empirical analysis of far left voters in Eastern and Western 
Europe. They serve as the baseline in a multinomial regression model and are compared to three 
other groups of voters (social democratic/green, center right and far right) with respect to their 
self-placement on the left-right and attitudes toward the nation‟s economy, their personal 
economic situation, government involvement to reduce differences in income levels and EU 
integration. Overall, far left voters are clearly to the left of everyone else. However, while 
Western European far left voters are very distinct from their social democratic/green 
counterparts, the far left electorate in Eastern Europe shows no significant difference to the 
center left for questions on one‟s own household income and government involvement to reduce 
inequalities. Furthermore, there is a clear disconnect between far left voters and parties in the 
East. Since the far left electorate occupies the expected far left space on the ideological scale 
they are at odds with the far left party family that is found right of the social democratic party 
family.  
I therefore conclude in the final section that the far left party family offers distinct vote 
choices and represents its voters in Western Europe with respect to the economy and European 
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integration – variables that have been identified as being a main characteristic for that particular 
party family and electorate. The lines between far left and center left in Eastern Europe is much 
more blurred, questioning the role of the far left party family. Not only are choices for voters 
limited but since the social democrats seem to occupy most of the space on the left of the 
ideological spectrum, matching attitudes of both far left and center left voters, representation of 
the citizens‟ preferences by the far left party family in the East is doubtful. This is turn has 
implications for the democratization process. If far left voters are faced with no or only 
inadequate choices and thus are not represented well, it is very likely for them to feel alienated 
and become indifferent to the political arena.  
 
11 
 
2.  Part One – Choices Provided by the Far Left Party Family in Western and Eastern  
Europe 
2.1.  Existing Characterizations of the Far Left Party Family and their Limitations 
 The research on far left parties is largely underdeveloped. Most existing studies focus on 
just one particular party, a specific country or a region.
7
 There are, however, a few cross-country 
analyses that enter the “potential political minefield” (March & Mudde 2005, p. 24) of trying to 
define what exactly it is that characterizes the parties on the far left of the ideological spectrum. 
This section will critically review accounts of West and East European far left parties, 
summarize their common attributes and point out the limitations thereof. 
With respect to far left (or communist) parties in Western Europe, authors agree on 
tracing their origin back to the worker‟s movement of the 19
th
 century, the resulting emergence 
of socialist and social democratic parties and the split from them in the 1917 Russian Revolution 
(Spier & Wirries 2007;  Bull 1995). The initial loyalty to the Soviet Union was replaced by the 
idea of Eurocommunism and the support of socialism while upholding the Western democratic 
traditions in the mid-1970s (Waller 1989). The revolution of 1989 and the eventual collapse of 
the Soviet Union resulted in the diversification of communist parties. While some kept their 
orthodox-Marxist and pro-Soviet character, others continued as reformed socialist parties or 
transformed into non-communist left parties.  
                                                          
7
 E.g. Forlenza 2010, Bordandini & Di Virgilio 2007, Mule 2005 (on Italian communist parties), Lazar 2003 & 
Lazar 1998 (comparing Italian and French communist parties), Lazar 2000 (on Western communist parties), Hough 
& Kos 2009, Hockenos 2009, Solty 2008, Nachtwey & Spier 2007, Olsen 2007, Friedrich 2004 (on the German Left 
Party), Lach et al 2010 (Czech communist party), Fisera 2009 (Slavic communist parties), Deen 2009, March 2007 
(Moldova), Spirova 2008 (Bulgaria), Charalambous 2007, Dunphy & Bale 2007 (Cyprus),  Buyukakinci 2005 
(communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe), Magone 2005 (Portugal), Haughton & Rybar 2004, Houghton 
2004 (Slovakia), Arter 2002 (Finlan and Sweden). 
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Therefore, today‟s far left parties of Western Europe present a diverse picture with many 
different ideological directions. Nevertheless, authors also emphasize that most of these parties 
have come together in the European Parliament as the “United Left” and represent the interests 
and grievances of leftist voters who do not see an alternative in green or social democratic 
parties, thus constituting its own party family (Klingemann 2006; Spier & Wirries 2007).  
The research on (former) communist parties in Eastern Europe comes to similar 
conclusions. Having originated in the same historical circumstances as their Western 
counterparts, they also varied in their support of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and 
had to reinvent themselves after 1989. Just like in Western Europe, some parties continued to 
promote Marxist-Leninist positions while others immediately distanced themselves from their 
predecessors and radically transformed by embracing social-democratic policies and programs 
(Hough 1995). The parties who remained communist in nature soon polarized around the issue of 
economic reform in Eastern Europe, especially its nature and the many setbacks that the newer 
democracies have experienced (Ishiyama 1995).   
The main difference between West and East European communist parties is twofold. 
First, while the former have had varying electoral success but were never part of a ruling 
coalition on the national level, the latter had been in office for decades and then lost their 
governmental importance after the revolutions in 1989, being forced into opposition and faced 
with competitive elections (Ishiyama 1995). Second, communist parties in Eastern Europe have 
combined socialist with nationalist issues. Dubbed “National Bolshevism”, “National 
Communism” or “Strasserism” (Ishiyama 2009), parties have made use of commonalities 
between the otherwise paradox dimensions by stressing “the importance of the state in solving 
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political, economic and social problems” and by denouncing their competitors on the left as 
enemies of the nation state (Hough 2005, p. 6).  
However, despite the variation within countries and across Europe, far left parties are 
typically perceived as a homogenous set of parties. Research commonly attributes them with the 
rejection of the socio-economic structure, values and practices of contemporary capitalism 
(Mudde 2009). These parties are understood as promoting alternative economic and power 
structures, which usually involves the redistribution of resources. Thus, far left parties are first 
and foremost “left” through “their identification of economic inequity as the basis of existing 
political and social arrangements” (March & Mudde 2005, p. 25). Today far left parties in 
Europe are comprised of communist, democratic socialist and social populist parties (March and 
Mudde 2005, March 2009). Green and new politics parties, on the other hand, are not included in 
the group of far left parties. Even though some of them were radical on the outset, most green 
and new politics parties have transformed into moderate left-wing parties, accepting capitalism 
and democracy (March and Mudde, p. 33). 
While the characterization of the far left party family mainly via economic policy stances 
is in itself not contentious, it is problematic that authors seem to follow a common path where 
“classification becomes almost a matter of conventional wisdom, and there seems little need to 
spell out or explain the categorizations involved” (Mair & Mudde 1998, p. 214). None of the 
studies cited above provide any empirical evidence for their claims. Rather than actually 
providing evidence for the connection between the far left party family and economic issues in a 
systematic manner, the literature relies solely on descriptive accounts of the historical and 
regional developments of former communist parties. 
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Thus, the next section will briefly summarize the four main approaches to party family 
characterizations. I will explain why a synchronic analysis of the parties‟ ideology and policy 
stances is the best method for developing criteria of classifying parties that are based on 
empirical evidence before moving on to the actual analysis itself.     
 
2.2.  Defining the Far Left Party Family Empirically 
 According to Mair & Mudde (1998) four different approaches have been used to define 
party families in a European context: 1) identification in terms of shared origin and/or sociology, 
2) classification by the international links parties forge across national frontiers, 3) by party 
policy and ideology and 4) by party labels.  
 The first approach, which mirrors the examples in the literature discussed above, relies on 
similar historical circumstances of parties. It harks back to Rokkan (1970) who grouped parties 
together according to four central cleavages that he had identified as having emerged from the  
national and industrial revolutions from the 16
th
 century onward.  Of course most importantly for 
the emergence and development of communist parties was the conflict between workers versus 
employers or owners. The crucial advantage of the shared origin/sociology approach is that it is 
based on “a widely shared and comprehensive theoretical model” within a broader European 
context (Mair & Mudde 1998, p. 215). However, its geographic limitations (the approach was 
mainly developed for Western Europe) might make it unsuitable outside a West European 
research focus and render it inadequate over time.  
Nevertheless, Mair & Mudde recommend using shared origin and/or sociology of parties 
if one is interested in tracing the long-term development of a party family. Since the focus of this 
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paper is on the current state of the far left party family this approach, which traces change and 
development over time, would be inappropriate as a method for definition.   
Two other approaches discussed but not recommended by Mair & Mudde are the use of 
either party labels/names or parties‟ association with international groups as a means of 
identification. Both approaches focus on the actions parties themselves take by either 
emphasizing the ideological self-understanding of a party or how it fits into a larger, 
multinational context. Despite the apparent straightforwardness, neither method guarantees a 
deeper understanding of a particular party family. In the case of party names/labels so many 
different denotations exist of communist, socialist and social democratic parties (Bull 1995; 
Padgett & Paterson 1991, discussion in footnote 1) that such an approach would only render 
unclear and ambiguous results. The same is true for the international organization approach. 
Here the major problem is that some parties are members of multiple international groups while 
others do not affiliate with an international federation at all. For example, many European 
communist parties are members of two far left international organizations within the European 
Parliament: the European Left and European United Left/Green Nordic Left.
8
   
A fourth approach that Mair & Mudde do approve of and will be used in this paper is the 
definition of party families by party policy or ideology. It is “based on the congruence of the 
policies and/or ideologies that are professed or even pursued by the parties” and has the 
advantage of having a variety of accessible and applicable data available for quantitative cross-
national analysis (Mair & Mudde 1998. p 217f.). A problem with this approach is that the usage 
of similar scales assumes that the same policy in one country means the same in another context. 
However, the party manifestos approach within this particular method has avoided that problem 
                                                          
8
 See http://www.european-left.org/english/about_the_el/member_parties/  and 
http://www.guengl.eu/showPage.php?ID=8876&LANG=1&GLANG=1.  
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by deriving the groupings or classifications from what the parties themselves have chosen to 
emphasize in their party programs.  
Some might argue that expert surveys are a better means to understand parties‟ (policy) 
positions than party manifestos. Especially with regards to complex inquiries, it is said that 
experts are well suited to “access and process diverse sources of information” (Hooghe et al 
2010, p. 689). Expert surveys are considered by some to be very flexible in that access to specific 
source information, such as election manifestos, is not required and the costs of administering 
them are low. Furthermore, rather than having to work with simplified data as in the case of the 
Comparative Manifestos Project, expert surveys allow researchers “to design dimensions 
deductively” (Hooghe et al 2010, p. 689).  
I still chose to use the Comparative Manifestos Project instead for several reasons. First 
and most importantly as mentioned above, party manifestos “directly reflect what the parties 
state as their position rather than what others judge it to be”. Second, the reliability and validity 
of such variables as the left-right scores have been examined in depth and numerous authors who 
satisfactorily used the Comparative Manifesto Project data have produced further testimonials in 
favor of it (Budge & Pennings 2007, p. 125).  
Moreover, different experts might use different dimension scales when placing parties 
and it could also be difficult for them to interpret a party‟s position accurately at single point in 
time (Benoit & Laver 2007). The selection of experts poses another problem. Sometimes too few 
or inappropriate experts are chosen (Hooghe et al 2010). Also, studies show that up to almost 16 
percent of experts can express ideological bias when placing parties on the left-right scale 
(Curini 2010). Given these concerns and since I am most interested in the position from a party‟s 
point of view, data from the Comparative Manifestos Projects best fits the objective of the paper. 
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Its application to an empirical analysis of the far left party family will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
3.1.  The Comparative Manifesto Project 
The data contained in the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) of the Social Science 
Research Center Berlin
9
 provides a great source for applying a common and comprehensive 
“check list” with respect to the ideology and policy stances of parties in general and members in 
the far left party family specifically (Budge et al 2001, Klingemann et al 2006, Mair & Mudde 
1998, p. 225). Every sentence in each party manifesto has been analyzed individually so that the 
authors were then able to estimate each party‟s position on a cross-national left-right scale and a 
variety of programmatic variables. In addition, parties were also coded along specific party 
family lines to be discussed in greater detail below (Budge et al 1987). 
Now according to Mair & Mudde there are still limitations and disadvantages associated 
with this approach. First, as with so many other methods, the CMP is skewed toward a Western 
European experience (Mair & Mudde 1998, p. 219). However, since this paper only focuses on 
countries of the European Union (including Western and Central Eastern European nations), the 
implications should be less dramatic. Furthermore, some might raise the concern that the CMP is 
also oriented toward the issues of older and bigger party families as well as toward categories 
that were deemed appropriate at the beginning of the 1980s when the project was initially started 
(Mair & Mudde 1998, p. 219). Because most of the communist parties trace their origins back to 
the beginning of the 19
th
 century and the social democrats, one of the oldest party families, and 
since the main issues in this paper center on traditional economic policy stances, a category that 
                                                          
9
 All Manifesto Project data was downloaded from: http://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/. 
 
18 
 
definitely was of importance when the Comparative Manifestos Project first was developed, 
these concerns do not affect this paper. 
 
3.2. Data and Method 
The most current CMP data set, including information on 651 parties in 51 countries from 
1990 to 2010, distinguishes between a total of eleven party families: Ecology parties, (former) 
Communist parties, Social democratic parties, Liberal parties, Christian democratic parties, 
Conservative parties, Nationalist parties, Agrarian parties, Ethnic and Regional parties, Special 
issue parties and Electoral alliances. The party families are “based on aggregation of positions 
across the manifestos” (Klingemann et al 2006, p. 13) with respect to 54 standard categories as 
they pertain to seven different domains: external relations, freedom and democracy, political 
system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society and social groups as developed by 
Budge et al (1987). As already discussed above, the focus will be on the left-right position and 
the economic variables. 
Returning to the initial question of this section, I am interested in seeing whether or not 
far left parties constitute their own distinct group with respect to the other party families but 
especially in comparison to social democratic and green parties in Western Europe (WE) and 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). I chose the following 33 European countries (19 WE and 14 
CEE) for which data of at least 2 different parties is available: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland.  
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Twenty-four of these countries match the ones included in the European Social Survey 
(ESS) round 4 of 2008 to be used for the analysis of far left voters in chapter 5.
10
 I deleted all 
other election data but the most recent available
11
 in order to get a closer match between the 
parties and actual voters I am analyzing, with the exception of the “European Integration” 
variable. While the 2009 and 2010 updates for the Parties Manifestos Project includes data on 
left-right positions and the economic variables, unfortunately the question on attitudes about 
“European Integration” seems to have been omitted. Therefore, I resorted to the somewhat older 
1990-2003 dataset without the updates, having to go as far back as 1994 for the analysis of 
parties‟ stances on European Integration. Using data from the most recent available manifestos 
makes sense since this present study is cross-national and not over time. There is not much use in 
exploring parties‟ policy stances from 1990 when some of them have since dissolved or 
considerably changed.  
Examining party groupings I used seven of the eleven original party family categories 
from the CMP for the initial analysis. I dropped agrarian parties, ethnic and regional parties, 
special issue parties and electoral alliances because they do not compete on the traditional left-
right scale (Ezrow, 2010, p. 12).   
 
3.3.  Variables 
The manifesto project combines several of its variables to create the following new 
programmatic variables which all tap into the above identified characteristics of communist/far 
                                                          
10
 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
11 
Ranging from 2001 to 2010, with the time difference between the ESS round 4 data from 2008 and the data from 
the Parties Manifestos Project not being greater than seven years.    
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left parties in Europe: left-right, planned economy, market economy, welfare and European 
integration.  
 
Left-Right Policy Dimension 
Left-right differences are not only the “single most important indicator of party policy” 
but also point to the underlying ideology “which meshes with membership of a generic „family‟ 
and other distinguishing party characteristics (Budge & Klingemann 2001). The variable 
describing the left-right position of a party consists of the sum of categories that pertain to the 
right minus the sum of categories referring to the left on the ideological scale. So according to 
Budge et al (2001) absolute positive notions of the military, freedom and human rights, 
constitutionalism, political authority, free enterprise, incentives, economic orthodoxy, welfare 
state limitation, national way of life, traditional morality, law and order and social harmony as 
well as a negative stand on protectionism characterize policies on the right end, denoted with 
+100, of the ideological spectrum.
12
  
Likewise, full scores on anti-imperialism/anti-colonialism sentiments, negative 
perceptions of the military as well as the support of peace, internationalism, market regulations, 
economic planning, protectionism, a controlled economy, nationalization, welfare state 
expansion, education expansion, labor groups and democracy represent the left end and  -100 on 
the ideological scale. Of course -100 and +100 are the absolute, ideal extremes with actual 
parties scoring somewhere in between, depending on their ideological makeup.  
 
 
                                                          
12
 In general then “negative scores represent left positions and positive scores represent right positions” 
(Klingemann et al 2006). 
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Planned and Market Economy, Welfare and European Integration 
Stances on a planned economy are measured with the help of three categories: positive 
view on market regulation, economic planning and a controlled economy. Contrary to that, party 
attitudes on market economy are measured in terms of positive opinions about free enterprise and 
economic orthodoxy. The welfare variable is constructed by combining the positive categories of 
social justice and welfare state expansion. Lastly, the variable that addresses party policies with 
respect to Europe is the difference between the positive and the negative European integration 
category. 
 
Distribution Scores, Degree of Overlap and Difference Scores 
 In order to empirically test the characteristics of the communist party family as provided 
by the CMP, I first compare the distribution of the left-right, economic policy and European 
integration stances of communist parties in West and East Europe. In a second step, I calculate 
the degree of overlap between communist parties and their competitors on the left by using 
difference scores between the 25th and 75th percentile.
13
 This is done the following way: I 
estimate the range for the far left/communist party family on a specific variable by computing 
the numeric value between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile, which serves as the 
baseline. I then calculate the numeric value for the left competitors (the social democratic and, in 
Western Europe, green party families) that matches the range of the communist party families. 
                                                          
13
 That way I capture the ideological space where most of the parties in one party family can be found, discounting 
outliers on both ends. 
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The thus estimated two values can be used to generate the amount of overlap in percent between 
the party families.
14
 Finally, difference scores help to explore any cross-country variation further.    
 
3.4. Findings 
Overall, the assertions from the literature with respect to economic policy stances are 
confirmed by the empirical analysis: communist parties in Europe can be found on the left side 
of the ideological spectrum, supporting planned economy and welfare measures and being 
opposed to market economy. However, there are very distinct differences between East and West 
Europe in regards to specific programmatic variables that need to be discussed in detail.      
Table 1 (see Appendix A) summarizes the distributions scores (minimum, maximum, 
median, 25th percentile, 75th percentile) for Western and Eastern communist parties across the 
left-right dimension, planned and market economy, welfare and European Integration. Beginning 
with the left-right positions (see also Figure 1) one can observe a clear tendency of party families 
from left to right with communist parties having the lowest median of –26.7 and nationalist 
parties exhibiting the highest median in Western Europe. On first sight, the range within each 
party family seems considerable and there is quite an overlap with neighboring party groups. For 
example, communist parties in Western Europe score from –48.0 to -16.8 on the left-right scale, 
overlapping with green and social democratic parties from -38.2 to -16.8. However, if one 
concentrates on the distribution between the 25th and 75th percentile in each party family on the 
left (where most of the parties can be found and outliers are excluded), the overlap between the 
communist party family and the social democratic parties is only 21.8 percent, making 
                                                          
14 
Here is an example: let us assume that the communist party family scores on the left-right dimension range from   
-20 (25th percentile) to -5 (75 percentile), which represents a total of 15 units on that particular scale. The party 
family competitor on the left (social democratic/green) has 25th and 75 percentile scores of -10 and +10, which 
matches 5 units (from -10 to -5) out of the 15. The overlap would therefore be 33.3%.       
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communist parties very distinct from this left competitor. The overlap between green and 
communist parties in Western Europe on the left-right dimension is a little bit greater with 44.2 
percent but still very dissimilar.   
 
Figure 1: Left-Right Party Position of European Party Families
15
 
      
 
In the case of Eastern Europe (also figure 1) the difference is less pronounced and of a 
curious nature. Before this can be analyzed, however, it is important to note that the data set for 
the 14 nations in that region did not include any green parties. Logically, this means that there is 
less competition for the communist party family in the East compared to its Western European 
counterpart where green parties in addition to social democratic parties also participate in the 
struggle for votes. Thus, one would expect less overlap because of the fewer “contestants” on the 
left. 
First, it is significant to report that the scores for the communist party family in the East 
(ranging from -14.5 to -1.3) are overall located more toward the center than in the West. 
Communist parties in the West are clearly “left” with the maximum score being -16.8 and thus 
smaller than the minimum score of the East communist party family. Even though the same 
                                                          
15
 This boxplot and the ones to follow graphically display the distributions of the variables by showing the lower and 
upper adjacent values (5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile), the 25th
th
 and 75
th
 percentile, the median and outside values 
(outliers).  
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general tendency of median scores increasing from the left to the right can be witnessed, 
communist and social democratic parties occupy somewhat more of the same space on the 
ideological scale. More important, however, is that these two party families exchange places on 
the left-right scale. The communist party group‟s median score of -6.3 is closer to the ideological 
center of zero than that of the social democratic party family (-11.0). This means that overall the 
social democratic party family is “more left” than the communist party family in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Though the overlap between the communist and social democratic parties in the 
East is only 29.2 percent when taking into account the 25th and 75th percentile, it does not 
change the fact that the numbers should be the other way around given not only the name “far 
left” but also the conclusions drawn in the literature already discussed. This has implications for 
party competition which will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
 The planned economy and market economy distribution scores should return 
diametrically opposed results with parties on the left more in favor of the former and 
disapproving of the latter and parties on the right exhibiting opposite sentiments
16
. Furthermore 
and according to the literature, among the left party families the communist parties should show 
greater policy support of a planned economy and greater policy objections to market economy 
than green and social democratic parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 At least with respect to Liberal, Christian Democratic and Conservative Parties (the center right party family). As 
the analysis shows, far right parties might be not as much in favor of a market economy as their competitors on the 
right of the ideological spectrum due to reasons that cannot be discussed within the limits of this paper (but see, for 
example, Bale et al (2010), who discuss the far right‟s appeal to member of the working class and the unemployed 
with regards to their economic policies).    
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Figure 2: Planned Economy 
  
 
While the median score for the communist party families in West Europe is the highest 
with respect to planned economy (figure 2) and thus in line with the expectations, this is not the 
case in Eastern Europe. Here, not only does the social democratic party family exhibit once again 
a more leftist position than the communists on the issue with a median score of 2.2 over 0.8 but 
the Christian Democratic party family has the highest median altogether. This means that two 
party families occupy the ideological space which traditionally “belongs” to the communist party 
family.  
However, focusing again on the distinction between social democratic and communist 
parties one needs to point out that the overlap in Eastern and Western Europe is 100 percent 
(using the 25th and 75th percentile).
17
 Party policy stances on planned economy are thus not a 
good measure for voters to make a decision about whom to choose.  
The results are completely the opposite for the market economy variable (figure 3), 
meaning that far left parties not only show the lowest support but there are also distinct 
differences between the different party families on the left at least in one of the two regions 
examined. In West Europe the communist party family has the lowest median (.08) as expected 
                                                          
17 
The overlap between the communist and green party family in Western Europe is 39.4 percent.  
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and the overlap with the social democratic party family is 0 percent (25th to 75th percentile). 
Clearly, party policy stances on market economy emerge as a very good measure of distinction 
and offer different choices to voters. Though the communist party family in Eastern Europe also 
has the lowest median score (.9 compared to 1.9 of the social democratic party family), it 
overlaps 100 percent with the social democrats. Clearly, party opinions on market economy offer 
no distinct choices between communist and social democratic parties in Eastern Europe.  
 
Figure 3: Market Economy 
     
 
 The welfare variable fares considerably well again in Western Europe (figure 4) in 
regards to a clear difference between communist and social democratic parties but especially in 
comparison to the East. The communist party family in Western Europe has the highest median, 
thus the greatest support for welfare expansions.
18
 However, the overlap with the social 
democratic party family is 65.3 percent
19
 (only taking the 25th to the 75th percentile into 
account).  
This rather considerable overlap can be viewed more favorable when comparing it to 
Eastern Europe because the latter provides a lot less choice in the matter. Here the matching on 
                                                          
18 
Though only by a margin of .1. 
19 
Though only 48.8 percent with the green party family. 
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the policy scale between the communist and the social democratic party families is not only 96 
percent but the latter is once more the greatest supporter of the left stances on welfare. While far 
left parties in Western Europe appear to exhibit their traditional role of supporting social 
measures in order to guarantee equality and security, these results point to less clearly defined 
party roles in the East. There, the social democratic party family is the biggest supporter of 
welfare expansion, having the highest median score (19.9), whereas the communist party family 
seems in favor of an extensive welfare system but less pronounced (with a median score of 14.9).   
 
Figure 4: Welfare 
  
  
The last programmatic variable, policy stances on European Integration (see figure 5), 
was included because the literature has suggested a clear difference between the West and East 
European communist party family. The latter is expected to exhibit stronger nationalist 
tendencies that are in opposition to a greater European Integration (see Ishiyama 2009, Hough 
2005). The results do not confirm that assertion. If anything, the communist party family in 
Eastern Europe appears to be slightly in favor of a further EU integration with a median of +1.8 
while its counterpart in the West is neutral on the issue (with a median of 0). The social 
democratic party families in East and West have both slightly higher median scores but the 
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overlap is only about 35 percent in the West and 48.8 percent in the West (considering the 25th 
to 75th percentile).  
 
Figure 5: European Integration 
  
 
All in all, compared to the social democratic party family, communist parties are a little 
less supportive of EU integration and thus distinct from their competitor on the left of the 
ideological spectrum. However, it needs to be noted that the national party family in East and 
West Europe overlaps nearly 100 percent with the communist parties, questioning the distinction 
between the two on this issue.  
 
 
3.5. Discussion 
 
 The above findings have important implications for voters in East and West Europe. The 
unambiguous consensus is that democratic regimes should be characterized by political choices 
they offer and the effectiveness of these choices (Wessels & Schmitt 2008). With respect to the 
former and as is tested in this paper, it is vital that the political supply, such as parties, offers 
alternatives in terms of ideologically distinguishable competitors (Dahl 1971). Focusing on 
ideology in general, communist parties in West Europe provide voters with a clear set of choices 
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on the left since the overlap with the social democratic and green parties is either small or 
moderate (see table 1). Likewise, on all programmatic variables with the exception of planned 
economy, the communist party family emerges as a distinct alternative to other leftist parties. 
Since the difference scores on planned economy do not reveal any major variation between 
countries but are generally low (see Appendix), one might conclude that communist parties in 
general do not emphasize alternatives to a capitalist system and rather focus on the opposition to 
a market economy.  
 
Table 1: Degree of Overlap between Communist and Social Democratic Parties on Policies 
(less than 30% = small, 31% to 60% = medium, more than 60% = large, looking at 25th to 75th percentile) 
 West Europe East Europe 
Left-Right Dimension small small20 
Planned Economy large large 
Market Economy small large 
Welfare medium large 
European Integration medium medium 
 
The picture is different for Eastern Europe. First of all, even though the general 
ideological overlap between communist and social democratic parties is small, it needs to be 
emphasized that the party families have switched places on the left-right dimension. This 
suggests that the parties of the party family are only communist in name, not with respect to their 
policy stances. Furthermore, considering the 25th to the 75th percentile, those two party families 
have a large degree of overlap with regards to planned economy, market economy and welfare 
policies. It is perhaps too early to announce a complete lack of choices for voters on the left. 
However, it is a first sign that people in Eastern Europe might not have distinct alternatives in 
elections, at least with respect to economic variables so important for the left of the ideological 
                                                          
20 But with reversed roles, as the social democratic party family is more left than the communists on the ideological 
scale. 
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dimension. Either parties that wanted to continue to promote Marxist-Leninist positions in the 
period of reinvention after 1989 actually embraced social-democratic policies and programs
21
 or 
social democratic parties increased their policy spectrum to garner the support of former 
communist voters. The small number of countries with communist parties might provide 
evidence for the dominance of the social democratic parties in the East. After all, of the fourteen 
CEE countries only the Czech Republic, Estonia, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia have 
communist parties according to the latest data from the Parties Manifestos Project.  
When choice sets are not sufficiently differentiated as is the case here in regards to the 
economic variables, this could lead to lower turnout which in turn is consequential for the 
democratic character of a polity and the legitimacy of political leaders (Wessels & Schmitt 
2008). After all, a large part of the citizenry in Eastern Europe still has socialistic views about 
the economy (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2006).  If communist and social democratic parties 
continue to be similar in Eastern Europe, one should question the applicability of different party 
families on the left or at least the implications of finding different families on the left competing. 
It appears that the social democrats cover all of the left positions with respect to the economy 
and also are most in favor of an expansion of the welfare system. Communist parties are only 
different in regards to European Integration. Here they seem to cater to a more conservative 
electorate which sets them apart from the social democrats. However, by doing so, they then 
overlap with the national party family. Overall, communist parties in East Europe do not offer 
distinct choices to their voters on issues that have been traditionally connected to the far left.     
                                                          
21
 After all, “[a]nti-system parties of the left have […] tended to moderate or to fade away. In the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union […] communist parties either gave up the ghost or transformed themselves into more 
widely acceptable social-democratic alternatives” (Mair 2008, p. 213). 
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4.  Part Two – Far Left Voters and the Degree of Representation by the Party Family 
4.1.  Voters of Far Left Parties – The Great Unknown? 
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, numerous far left parties exists in 
differing strength throughout Western and Eastern Europe. Hence, there are people who vote for 
these parties. Just like there are gaps in the literature on empirically examining the far left party 
family, the research on voters of far left parties is almost non-existent (Neu, 2009), leaving many 
questions unanswered: What is the rationale behind the far left electorate? Is it a homogenous 
group of voters across Europe, which seems unlikely, or do different motives determine a similar 
electoral choice? Does the far left party accurately reflect its voters‟ preferences? In order word, 
is there a linkage between far left parties and the far left electorate?  
With respect to part one I want to explore in how far the far left parties‟ positions on the 
left-right scale and support of/opposition to planned economy, market economy, welfare and 
further European integration mirror the preferences of their electorate. Considering the findings 
from the previous sections I expect a better representation of far left voters by the far left party 
family in the West than in the East, taking into account that the Eastern communist parties 
provide less specific alternatives and choices.  
Finding a comprehensive definition of far left parties is difficult as the above analysis 
proves. Trying to discover something about voters of such parties is therefore equally 
challenging especially given the lack of research on that topic (Neu 2009). When it comes to the 
question of what motivates someone to vote for far left parties there is an absence of a 
comprehensive research tradition. Therefore, the starting point will to be to discuss what is 
known about influences on political behavior in general with specific examples that pertain to the 
left and as derived from the discussion of the far left party family in the previous chapters. From 
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this I will develop the hypotheses for voting behavior of the far left electorate to be tested in a 
cross-national context.  
Among the factors said to determine voting behavior are the social structures such as 
religion and class, long-term predispositions like party identification, value orientation and 
ideological orientation, and short-term factors represented by issues, retrospective judgment and 
political leaders (Thomassen 2005). The analysis presented here will focus on left-right 
ideological orientations, economic voting and the issue of Euroskepticism with respect to far left 
voters for reasons already named and as explained in the respective sections. A discussion of the 
dependent and independent variables will be followed by a multinomial logistic regression model 
that tests in how far the above named variables are suitable to distinguish between far left voters 
and voters of other party families.   
 
4.2. Left-Right Ideology 
  Just as left-right differences are valued to be the “single most important indicator of party 
policy” (Budge et al 2001), the placement of the electorate on the ideological scale is thought to 
be very instrumental in predicting vote choice. After all, “the language of „left and right‟ 
provides parties and voters with a shared policy space and students of politics with a powerful 
tool for evaluating elite–mass correspondence over policy” (Hellwig 2008, p. 687). Often the 
left-right ideology of a voter is used as one of the most important elements of party choice. 
Though there is research focusing on the decline in importance of left-right orientations (e.g. 
(Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt & Rehm 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006), the fact remains 
that placement on the left-right scale is still an adequate determinant of voters‟ overall ideology 
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and their preferred choice of at least the party family (Klingemann 1995, Klingemann et al 
2006).  
 With respect to the far left voters in Europe, by definition one expects them to be on the 
left side of the ideological scale. However, taking into account the findings from the party family 
analysis, there could be marked differences between East and West Europe. Whereas far left 
voters in the West could be to the left of their social democratic and green counterparts, the 
distinction between communist and social democratic voters in the East might be less clear. 
Should voters really align with their respective party family then Eastern communist voters will 
be to the right of social democratic voters. Hence, I derive the following hypotheses: 
H1: Far left voters in East and West Europe place themselves on the left of the ideological 
scale. 
H2: Far left voters in Western Europe place themselves on the left of green and social 
democratic voters. 
H3:  Far left voters in Eastern Europe do not place themselves on the left of social democratic 
voters.    
 
4.3.  Economic Voting/Economic Insecurity and the (Far) Left 
The sections on the far left party family have also emphasized the importance of the 
economy as a measure of distinction to other party families in general and the social democratic 
and green parties in particular. With respect to voting behavior, economic voting comes closest 
to address this issue because worries about one‟s own or the nation‟s economic situation goes 
hand in hand with the support of greater welfare measures and the distrust of free market 
economy as will be explained below.  
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Economic voting as a theory about applied rational behavior seeks to explain voters‟ 
decision making in the light of evaluating a nation‟s economy (Dorussen and Palmer, 2002, p. 1). 
In an ideal situation, the electorate will express its preferences with respect to the handling of the 
economy at the ballot. Incumbent governments are evaluated on the basis of economic policy 
outcomes such as unemployment, inflation, growth etc. Any politician who fails to regard the 
public‟s policy goals or is incompetent in managing the economy will be “punished” by getting 
voted out of office. This reasoning refers directly to the responsibility hypothesis where “voters 
hold the government responsible for economic events” (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000, p. 2).  
But while the literature has demonstrated that the economy and its performance are 
indeed salient issues among the electorate and influence election outcomes, controversies 
surround “the nature of the economic-voting calculus” (Dorussen and Palmer, p. 2). Questions 
such as which economic policies matter most, what is more important – national economic 
conditions or the personal financial situation or is there variance across voter groups, political 
systems and electoral contexts are raised (Dorussen and Palmer; Lewis-Beck and Paldam). For 
the purpose of this paper I am interested in the link between the perception of economic 
insecurity and the electoral support of parties, specifically the implications for parties on the left 
of the ideological spectrum. 
Aldrich et al (2002) show in their analysis that there is a direct link between changes in 
the economy and individual economic insecurity. In their analysis of an ANEAS study from 
1999 and a World Value Survey project including 17 OECD countries from 2000, the authors 
show that external economic shocks induce increased feelings of economic insecurity in 
individuals (Aldrich et al, p. 13). Furthermore, by examining single-country studies from the 
United States, Canada, Mexico, Israel and the United Kingdom, Aldrich et al also establish that 
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the more an individual feels economic insecurity the greater will be the preference for enhanced 
levels of social welfare. These changes in feelings of economic security and in policy 
preferences in turn then affect the vote choice made by citizens (p. 21). But how exactly does 
economic insecurity translate into a certain party choice? 
Two diametrically opposed models are proposed and discussed in the economic voting 
literature with respect to parties on the left. The “luxury-goods model” theorizes that voters will 
be more willing to support social luxuries such as health care programs, social welfare or 
unemployment insurances, traditionally associated with a leftist policy agenda, when the 
economy is doing well (Stevenson,  2002, p. 48). Conversely, in times of economic decline, 
fiscally conservative parties such as the Liberal, Christian Democratic and Conservative parties 
will profit at the ballot. The underlying assumption of this model is that “voters prefer economic 
conservatism during downturns and are willing to „buy‟ more public services during economic 
good times” (Stevenson, p. 50). 
Contrary to the luxury-goods model, the Keynesian/safety-net model hypothesizes that 
exact opposite. According to it, good economic performances will lead to a gain in rightist 
parties‟ votes while left parties lose them. But in turn poor economic performances will lead to a 
loss for rightist parties‟ votes while leftist parties see an increase in votes (Stevenson, p. 51). 
Even though the electoral outcome for the two models is the same, the mechanisms are different. 
The Keynesian model assumes voters who think that the Left will borrow money and spent it 
more freely than the right in times of economic troubles in order to boost demand. These 
assumptions are problematic since they not only require the voter to understand Keynesian 
demand management, but the theory has also been rejected after the economic crisis in 1970 
(Stevenson, p. 51).  
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More logically likely and supported is the safety-net model according to Stevenson. It 
suggests that during economic recessions voters are more concerned with healthcare, 
unemployment insurance and general welfare. Thus, the electorate will vote for the Left to assure 
these beneficial policies especially during bad economic periods when they are needed most. Just 
like the luxury-goods model, the safety-net model does not require the voter to be specifically 
sophisticated and it makes a clear distinction between the Left and the Right in regards to the 
policies they pursue (Stevenson, p. 51). 
Stevenson‟s empirical analysis of the three proposed models in eleven Western European 
countries and Canada reveals only little evidence for economic voting due to the aggregated 
economic data. Where a relationship is statistically significant, the luxury-goods model is 
supported (Stevenson, p. 63). Other studies, however, show evidence in favor of the safety-net 
hypothesis.  
Huber and Inglehart (1995) survey of political scientists, political sociologists and survey 
researchers in 42 countries across the world, for example, revealed that parties on the left are 
perceived as wanting to protect the status quo in terms of government regulation and securing the 
welfare state (p. 85). Bohrer and Tan‟s 2000 study of the impact of the Maastrich Treaty criteria 
for entry into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1992 examines the relationship 
between economic insecurity and a rise in left votes. Over a time period of seventeen years (1980 
to 1997) unemployment steadily increased in numerous EU countries. The simultaneous rise of 
vote totals for leftist parties, therefore, was sparked by a voters‟ hope of spurring employment or 
at least protecting the benefits for those who were unemployed, provided that the incumbent 
presiding over high unemployment was not belong to a left party (Bohrer and Tan, p. 582, 588). 
Leftist parties were perceived as the defenders of the social welfare state.   
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Similarly, Kwon (2005) took partisan voting behavior into account in his study on 
economic insecurity across European countries. Contrary to other research, the author focuses on 
an individual subjective assessment of economic insecurity (in this case worry about 
employment) rather than relying on unemployment statistics, growth rate, inflation measure or 
national perceptions of economy as has been common. He finds that “previous right voters are 
likely to make a transition to support for left parties when they experience higher levels of 
economic insecurity. In demand for more social protection, there are new Left voters who make 
a transition upon economic insecurity” (Kwon, p. 18). 
All of the above examples support a general notion of economic insecurity and the 
voter‟s choice for a left party. Since this paper is focused on a particular party family and its 
voters, however, I want to explore if the relationship between economic insecurity and left vote 
choice is even stronger for the far left. Is there an actual difference not just between the Right 
and the Left in general but also between the center left/green and far left parties? Recalling again 
the results from the party family analysis, the overlap between communist and social 
democratic/green parties in the West was small. This is not true for the East, however, where I 
found an overlap of 100 percent with regards to market economy policy stances and 96 percent 
for welfare between the communist and the social democratic party families. Thus, the following 
hypotheses can be developed: 
H4: The more an individual feels economically insecure, the more likely he or she will be to 
vote for a party on the left of the ideological spectrum.  
H5: In Western Europe voters of far left parties will feel even more economically insecure 
than voters of center left/green parties. 
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H6: In Eastern Europe there will be no clear distinction between communist and social 
democratic voters with respect to economic insecurity. 
  
4.4.  Euroskepticism 
 In connection with economic insecurity, Euroskepticism has been identified as a second 
factor that might explain a person‟s far left vote. In addition, by examining not only the 
predominant national issues but also an international one, the analysis broadens its framework as 
it did in regards to the far left party family.  
While the integration of the European Union was largely uncontested until the early 
1990s, most EU member states have witnessed an often dramatic decrease in public support for 
European integration (De Vries and Kersbergen, 2007, p. 307).  
Two main perspectives dealing with the support of the EU are the utilitarian self-interest 
perspective and the national identity perspective. The former asserts that support for European 
integration depends strongly on national economic conditions (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton, 
1993). Increases in inflation rate and unemployment and decreases in the GDP are negatively 
correlated with support for further EU integration. The national economic conditions then not 
only affect the evaluation of national but also of supranational governments – in this case the 
European Union (Eichenberg and Dalton, p. 528). Citizens are more likely to have positive 
attitudes towards the EU if they associate an economic benefit with it. 
The latter national identity perspective, in turn, focuses on utilitarian reasoning and 
national identity as important predictors of support for the EU. The more an individual identifies 
with his or her nation and thus shows high levels of national identity, the less likely this person 
will be to favor the EU (e.g. Carey, 2002; Luedtke 2005). Likewise, attachments to closer 
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territorial entities or regions have the same negative effect on EU support (Carey, p. 399). More 
recent works, however, tend to emphasize the combined effects of economic and identity factors 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2007). 
Interestingly, strong anti-EU positions can be found on the fringes of the left-right-
spectrum (Hooghe et al, 2002; De Vries and Edwards, 2009). While the national party systems 
have evolved around the left-right axis, issues concerning European integration can also be 
linked to the left-right dimension (Hooghe et al, 2002). More specifically, combining the left-
right spectrum with a scale measuring support for the EU one gets an inverted U-curve with 
parties in the ideological mainstream supporting the integration process and extremist parties on 
the left and right opposing integration (figure 2 in Hooghe et al, 2002, p. 970).  
Is the rationale behind this simply that peripheral parties with weak electoral support try 
to restructure contestation and exploit EU integration as a controversial issue? Is it the parties‟ 
ideology that prevents the far left and the far right to support the process since EU integration 
has largely been a project of the center parties? Somewhat contrary two these two suggestions by 
Hooghe et al (2002) (see also March, 2009), De Vries and Edwards claim that Euroskpeticism 
among extreme parties revolves around the same dimensions as discussed above: economic and 
cultural opposition (p. 9).  
While Azmanova (2005) stipulates that European radical parties on both ends of the 
political spectrum embrace social protectionism, which is geared toward citizens concerned with 
the growing economic and social risks (p. 291), De Vries and Edwards announce different 
reasoning behind right- and left-wing Euroskepticism. The authors theorize that extreme right-
wing parties “tap into feelings of cultural insecurity” while extreme left-wing parties “resist 
further integration on the basis of the neoliberal character of the project and its negative 
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influence on the welfare state,” focusing on economic insecurity (De Vries and Edwards, p. 9). A 
study of 14 Western European EU member states, utilizing individual-level and contextual data, 
confirms De Vries and Edward‟s hypotheses (p. 19).  
The policy stances on European integration – or the skepticism thereof – was the only 
variable in the party family analysis where there was no difference between Eastern and Western 
Europe. The far left party family in the East as well as the West has a medium overlap with the 
social democratic/green parties, supporting European integration slightly less than their 
competitors on the left. Hence, I conclude this final hypothesis: 
H7:  Far left voters in Eastern and Western Europe alike will be more skeptical about the 
European integration than voters of the social democratic/green party family. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis of Far Left Voters in Europe 
5.1. Data and Method 
Having hypothesized that the position on the left-right dimensions and attitudes on 
economic insecurity as well as Euroskepticism are possible factors contributing to vote choice 
for a far left party in European countries, this analysis employs data at the individual level 
aggregated across all countries to generate a general idea about far left voters across Europe.  In 
addition, it will also provide information about the linkage between far left parties and their 
voters. The empirical test will answer the questions in how far preferences of the far left 
electorate are represented by their party of choice.  
This analysis utilizes round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2008.
22
 The total 
number of nations in the data set is thirty.
23
 Most of the countries are European but Russia, 
                                                          
22
 The dataset and codebook were downloaded from http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. 
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Ukraine, Israel and Turkey are also included. Since this study's focus is specifically on Europe I 
excluded all non-European nations. The following twenty-five
24
 (15 WE and 10 CEE) countries 
remain: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.  
 
5.2.  Variables 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, vote choice, is defined based on the following question asked in 
all ESS rounds: Which party did you vote for in that election? [Country (Question B12).
25
 The 
respondents were given a country-specific list of all eligible parties in that national election 
following the question. In order to make comparisons between vote choices for parties of 
different party families, I created a new variable with 4 categories: 1 being equal to having voted 
for a far left party, 2 capturing voters of social democratic and green parties, 3 constituting center 
right parties and, finally, 4 those who voted for a far right party.
26
 In order to determine a party‟s 
ideology I used data from the Manifesto Project and cross-checked it with available data for far-
left parties from March (2009).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
23
 Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
24
  Lithuania had to be excluded in addition to the four non-European countries because the data was corrupted. 
25
 Which followed the question: “Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the 
last [country] national election in [month/year]?” 
26 
For Western Europe this generated a total of 18621 observations: Far left (category 1) N=1653; center left/green 
(category 2) N=7273, center right (category 3) N=9174; far right (category 4) N=521.  
For Eastern Europe a total of 9604 observations were thus generated: far left (category 1) N=191, center left/green 
(category 2) N=3010, center right (category 3) N=5946), far right (category 4) N=457.  
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As already discussed, the Manifesto Project divides parties into ecology, communist, 
social democratic, liberal, Christian-democratic, conservative, nationalist, agrarian, ethnic and 
regional and special issue parties, whereas the last three categories were eliminated. Approaching 
the classification of parties from the difference in understanding the economy and economic 
systems, communist parties make up category “1” - far left parties. Social-democratic and 
ecological parties are combined in category “2” of my analysis. Liberal, Christian-democratic 
and conservative parties were included in the third category while nationalist parties make up the 
fourth category of far right parties. In the case where a party‟s ideology could not be clearly 
identified (for example the Italian Verdi e SDI (Girasole), a party which combined a green party 
with a socialist one for just one election) or where responses were so few that they were 
classified as “other”, they were omitted from the sample and excluded from the statistical 
analysis. 
 
Independent Variables 
The main independent variables are the three different variables/types of issues identified 
as possibly influencing far left vote choice. The first is the left-right position on the ideological 
scale, the second group comprises economic factors and the last refers to Euroskepticism.  
First, as hypothesized above, placement on the left-right scale should roughly correspond 
with the party families‟ position – at least in Western Europe. The Party Manifesto Project 
derives it scores from the coded categories that pertain to the right and the left on the ideological 
spectrum (including attitudes on the military, peace, freedom and human rights, 
constitutionalism, political authority, the economy, the welfare state, internationalism, the 
national way of life, education, democracy, law and order, social harmony etc.). I use the 
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following question in the ESS dataset to test hypotheses 1 through 3: “In politics people 
sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this 
scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” (Question B23).  
Secondly, Huber and Inglehart (1995), Bohrer and Tan (2000) and Kwon (2005) 
theorized and tested the notion that left votes increase with economic insecurity. Having done the 
most comprehensive study, Kwon conceptualizes economic insecurity across countries with 
individual responses to the following pair of survey questions from Eurobarometer 40: 
“Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the employment situation in this country now is…?” 
and “Compared to 12 months ago, do you think your own job situation is…? (p. 47f.).
27
  
Unfortunately, no round of the ESS dataset includes the same or similar questions to 
directly recreate Kwon‟s test. However, I argue that general questions about the state of the 
economy will capture economic insecurity just as well. Instead of assessing economic insecurity 
through unemployment, I choose attitudes concerned with the economy itself as well as personal 
satisfaction with income to reveal an individual‟s perception of his or her financial means in the 
ESS round 4. The questions “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the 
economy in [country]?” (Question B25)
28
 and “Which of the descriptions on this card comes 
closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?” (Question F33)
29
 are the 
measures for economic insecurity. Since it has been consistently shown that national economic 
voting is generally stronger than personal economic voting (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2002, p. 
114), I test each question separately and expect to find stronger results for the question on the 
economy of the respondent‟s country than feelings about the overall personal household income. 
                                                          
27 
4-point scale with possible answers of: A lot better, a little better, stay the same, a little worse, a lot worse. 
28
 11-point scale with 0 being “extremely dissatisfied” and 10 being “extremely satisfied”. 
29
 4-point scale, 1 “living comfortably on present income”, 2 “coping on present income”. 3 “finding it difficult on 
present income” and 4 “finding it very difficult on present income”.  
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As mentioned above, I not only anticipate finding left voters generally to feel more economically 
insecure but far left voters in particular – at least in Western Europe. In addition, the round 4 of 
the ESS also asks whether or not one agrees with the following statement: “The government 
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” (Question B30).
30
 So left voters in 
general should agree more with this statement than voters on the right. However, I expect more 
pronounced differences in Western Europe between social democrats/green and far left voters 
(the latter with the greater agreement) than in Eastern Europe. 
Thirdly, to test for Euroskepticism according to De Vries & Edwards‟ (2007) findings, I 
utilize the question about attitudes on European unification: “Now thinking about the European 
Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. 
Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?”
31
 As hypothesized, I 
expect to find a general difference between far left voters and voters of the other left parties 
(social democratic and green)
32
 but no significant difference between East and West European 
far left voters.            
Lastly, the usual control variables age (here in years), gender (male coded 1, female 
coded 2) and education (in years completed) were also included. Thus the model for Eastern and 
Western Europe alike can be written as: 
 
 
VoteChoice (far left=baseline )  =   α + β1(left-right)  
+ β2(satisfaction with country’s economy)  
                                                          
30
 5-point scale ranging from 0 “agree strongly” to 5 “disagree strongly”. 
31
 11-point scale ranging from 0 “unification has already gone too far” to 10 “unification should go further”. 
32
 With the latter being in greater support of a further European integration than far left/communist voters. 
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    + β3(satisfaction with personal income)  
+ β4(European Integration) 
+ β5(age) + β6(education) + β7(Gender) + γ1ci  
where γ denotes the fixed country (c) effects. My baseline of the dependent variable is 
constituted by voters of far left parties. The results from the multinomial logistic regression are 
displayed in table 1 (West) and 2 (East).
33
  
Since logit models in general are difficult to interpret because “there is no measure that 
exactly summarizes the impact on the response of a unit increase in a given explanatory variable, 
net of other predictors in the model” (DeMaris 1993, p. 1057), I chose to calculate odds ratios
34
 
for a more substantive description. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates an increased chance of 
an event occurring versus the event not occurring. An odds ratio less than 1, in turn, indicates a 
decreased chance of an event occurring versus the event not occurring (Liao 1994). Tables with 
the usual coefficients can be found in the appendix. 
 
5.3.  Findings 
Left-Right 
 The left-right positions of far left voters clearly follow the expectations of hypothesis 1 
and 2. European left voters in general are to the left of the center right and far right electorate. 
Moreover, far left voters in Western Europe are also “more left” on the ideological scale than 
their social democratic and green counterparts, confirming a good match between party family 
                                                          
33
 Full tables including coefficients of all independent variables and country dummy variables can be found in the 
appendix. 
34
 When using the command mlogit in STATA one calculates relative risk ratios instead of odds ratios. However, 
relative risk ratios resemble odds ratios given by simple logistic regressions (Hamilton 2008) and thus I will use the 
more familiar term in the discussion of the results. 
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and voters. Hypothesis 3, however, is not confirmed. Rather than social democratic voters being 
to the left of the communist party voters in the East (as predicted because of the party family 
analysis results in chapter 3), far left voters are the group most to the left compared to the other 
three voter categories just like in the West. All results are statistically significant at the .05 level.  
 In the case of Eastern Europe the findings have immediate implications. Though it is a 
positive sign that voters in the East align on the left-right scale just like their counterparts in the 
West, the ideological congruence between the communist party family and its voters is not given. 
While voters of communist parties place themselves far to the left, the communist party family 
itself is closer to the center with the social democratic party family filling the ideological space. 
There is clearly a mismatch between voters and parties in the East   
 
Economic Insecurity 
 Results for the economic insecurity hypotheses are mixed. The general assertion that the 
more economically dissatisfied a voter the more likely he or she will be to vote for a party on the 
left of the ideological spectrum is confirmed. Voters of left parties are less satisfied with their 
nation‟s economy and have a more difficult time to live on their household‟s income than voters 
of center right and far right parties in both Western and Eastern Europe. These results are only 
statistically significant at the .05 level for comparing Western center right voters to far left voters 
with respect to personal income, however. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the voters on the left. The odds of the green/center left electorate being 
satisfied with the nation‟s economy is 1.04 (West) and 1.13 (East) times the odds of far left 
voters being satisfied with the nation‟s economy, confirming hypothesis 5 but disproving 
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hypothesis 6 at least with respect to this particular variable.
35
 In terms of household income, 
however, only Western far left voters have a more difficult time (odds of 1.14) living on their 
household income compared to the center left/green electorate. The value, though, is not 
statistically significant for the Eastern far left electorate.  
   The question about government measures to reduce difference in income levels fares 
better. Compared to center left/green, center right and far right voters across all of Europe, the 
far left electorate agrees the most with government involvement in order to decrease differences 
in income. Furthermore, these results also hold when far left voters are compared to the center 
left/green voters. Specifically, the odds of the far left to support government involvement are 
1.21 (West) and 1.16 (East) the odds of the green/center left electorate supporting those 
measures.  
However, while all the values for the different party categories are statistically significant 
at the .05 level for Western Europe, this is only true for the comparison between far left and 
center right voters in the East. There is no statistically significant difference in the degree of 
agreement between far left voters and social democratic as well as far right voters, lending some 
support for hypothesis 6. Both questions on one‟s own household income and government 
involvement render no clear distinction between different groups of left voters in Eastern Europe, 
mirroring the large overlap of the communist and social democratic party family in regards to 
economic and welfare policy stances.  
 
Euroskepticism 
                                                          
35
 I had predicted no significant difference between far left and center left voters on all accounts. 
 
48 
 
  The last hypothesis in the analysis of far left voters in Europe deals with attitudes toward 
further European integration. I had predicted that Western and Eastern far left voters would be 
more skeptical of further European integration than voters of social democratic/green parties. 
This is confirmed. On a statistically significant level voters of social democratic and green 
parties are more favorable (odds of 1.07 in the West and 1.11 in the East) toward the continuous 
European integration process than the far left electorate, thus being consistent with the findings 
from the party family analysis.  
 While I am unable to determine whether it is social protectionism (Azmanova 2005) or 
feelings of cultural insecurity and the understanding of a negative influence on the welfare state 
(De Vries & Edwards 2009) that create these attitude, I definitely find that Euroskepticism exists 
on both ends of the political spectrum. There is no statistically significant difference between far 
left and far right voters in the East on the question of European integration. In Western Europe, 
far right voters are even more opposed to a continuation of the European integration process than 
left voters (statistically significant at the .05 level).  
 
Control Variables 
The control variable age is statistically significant for various voter categories. In 
Western Europe voters of far left parties are on average older than their social democratic/green 
and center right counterparts.
36
 Interestingly, this observation is reversed in Eastern Europe. 
Here, far left voters are younger than voters of the other categories.
37
 Gender is only significant 
in Western Europe with respect to far right voters. On average they tend to be more male than far 
                                                          
36
 This is also true with respect for far right voters but it fails to reach statistical significance at the .05 level. 
37
 Statistically significant at .05 for center left/green and center-right voters. 
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left voters. Finally, far left voters tend to have more years of education than all other voters in 
Western and Eastern Europe.
38
  
 
Table 1: West 
 Far Left    Center Left Center Right Far Right 
VARIABLES Baseline 2 3 4 
     
Left-Right  1.615*** 3.715*** 3.829*** 
  (0.0337) (0.0924) (0.1430) 
Satisfaction w/ national 
economy 
 1.047*** 1.023 0.953 
  (0.0177) (0.0191) (0.0287) 
Satisfaction w/ 
household income 
 0.881*** 0.766*** 0.873 
  (0.0407) (0.039) (0.0736) 
Gov’t involvement 
(income) 
 1.215*** 1.499*** 1.144** 
  (0.0478) (0.0634) (0.0730) 
European Integration  1.067*** 1.005 0.822*** 
  (0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0198) 
Age  1.011*** 1.0147*** 1.002 
  (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0039) 
Gender  1.069 1.043 0.698*** 
  (0.0701) (0.0753) (0.0833) 
Education  0.970*** 0.990 0.941*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0094) (0.0151) 
     
Observations 17,085    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Statistically significant at .05 compared to social democratic voters in the East and to social democratic/green and 
far right voters in the West. 
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Table 2: East  
 (Far Left)  (Center Left) (Center Right) (Far Right) 
VARIABLES Baseline 2 3 4 
     
Left-Right  1.143*** 2.027*** 1.975*** 
  (0.0536) (0.0955) (0.1025) 
Satisfaction w/ national 
economy 
 1.127** 1.0690 0.987 
  (0.0566) (0.0541) (0.0569) 
Satisfaction w/ household 
income 
 0.918 0.888 0.893 
  (0.1158) (0.1123) (0.1288) 
Gov’t involvement  
(income) 
 1.160 1.268** 1.077 
  (0.1103) (0.1211) (0.1190) 
European Integration  1.106*** 1.093** 1.004 
  (0.0405) (0.0402) (0.0421) 
Age  0.986** 0.986** 0.986* 
  (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0073) 
Gender  1.178 1.075 0.697* 
  (0.2214) (0.2030) (0.1499) 
Education  0.941* 0.922** 0.958 
  (0.0305) (0.0298) (0.0346) 
Observations 7,570    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Country Effects 
It is important to note that of all the country variables Great Britain (West) and Slovakia 
(East) were omitted because of collinearity, meaning that the voters of those two countries were 
too similar to the respective baseline nations (Belgium and Bulgaria). In the East, none of the 
countries have statistically significant coefficients in the model across all three voter groups 
compared to the far left electorate. This means that there are virtually no country effects in the 
East and the model does well just with the left-right and programmatic variables.  
Contrary to that, almost all country dummy variables are statistically significant in the 
West which could be due to several factors. One possible explanation is the great difference in 
number of observations between the various countries. Furthermore, macro-level attributes such 
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as institutions and electoral laws could also be the cause of country effects. Future research will 
have to include multilevel factors for a better understanding of the cross-country variation.    
 
5.4. Discussion 
 First of all, the findings are a confirmation for the plausibility of the chosen variables. On 
an aggregated cross-country level, placement on the left-right scale, economic insecurity and 
Euroskepticism are characteristic for voters of far left parties. This particular electorate therefore 
can be described as feeling economically deprived and threatened by the process of EU 
integration.  
However, one needs to differentiate between Western and Eastern Europe. The results for 
far left voters in the West are largely in compliance with the hypotheses, demonstrating that far 
left voters are a distinct group just like their party family. Not only do they place clearly on the 
left of the ideological spectrum but they can also be differentiated from the center left of social 
democratic and green voters. Far left voters are thus less satisfied with the nation‟s economy and 
find it more difficult to live on their household‟s income than the center left electorate. Far left 
voters are also more in favor of government involvement to decrease income level differences. 
Finally, they are more skeptical of further European integration efforts compared to social 
democratic and green voters. Overall, it appears that issues important to far left voters are 
generally mirrored by the far left party family in the West. Though this paper cannot make any 
claims about the policy implementation of preferences, it provides some evidence for 
representation. After all, far left parties and the far left electorate can be found roughly in the 
same place on the left-right scale and exhibit similar attitudes toward the economy and further 
EU integration.   
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The findings for their Eastern counterparts prove to be more difficult. Though far left 
voters follow the general pattern of aligning with left issues compared to voters on the right, 
there is a lack of variation between the far and center left, similarly to what I found in regards to 
the party families. Both voter groups are equally dissatisfied with their household income and 
prefer more government involvement. Thus, the economic insecurity variables are not the best 
measures in describing far left voters in the East. Furthermore, the results have implications 
beyond the fitting of the model in terms of choices for voters and representation by parties which 
will be discussed below in the conclusion.        
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper set out to empirically examine the far left party family and its voters across 
Europe in order to fill a gap in the literature. It addresses the question of where exactly far left 
parties and their voters occupy the ideological space on the left. The paper also provides answers 
to whether or not economic policy stances and attitudes on European integration are a good 
measure for defining the far left party family, all the while showing the differences between 
Eastern and Western Europe. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the choices offered by the far left 
party family in Western and Eastern Europe and studied to what extend far left parties match 
their voters‟ preferences.  
The analysis of data from the Comparative Manifestos Project and the European Value 
Survey demonstrates that the far left party family and its voters can be clearly distinguished not 
only from the right but also with respect to the other competitors on the left in Western Europe 
while the demarcations are more blurred in the East 
The empirical analysis of the far left party families in Europe provides a systematic study 
of economic policy stances, which have been identified as key issues for far left parties. I find 
that the communist party family clearly positions itself on the left of the ideological spectrum 
with respect to its support of planned economy and an expansion of the welfare system as well as 
its opposition to a market economy. 
However, while far left parties distinguish themselves from their social democratic and 
green competitors on most issues in Western Europe, a great deal of issue overlap can be 
witnessed for East European countries. Not only is their general position on the left-right scale 
reversed but the demarcation between communist and social democratic parties and their 
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attitudes toward planned and market economy are blurred to a considerable degree.   
 This then has implications for the democratic process in the region. As stated in the 
beginning of the paper, parties are thought to be fundamental for democracy in Europe. They not 
only express the ideological preferences of citizens and convert them into public policy, thus 
representing their electorate, but parties are also vital for defining the choices available to their 
voters. When no meaningful choices are offered by parties, indifference or alienation can be the 
result. 
In the case of Eastern Europe, there is obviously a lack of difference between alternatives 
on the left of the ideological (political) spectrum, limiting the voters‟ choice-set. One result 
might be that communist and social democratic parties converge even more on issues until one 
becomes obsolete and might cease to exist – a possibility already discussed above – thus 
reducing the party variety on the left, as can be seen with the absence of communist parties in 
many countries of Eastern Europe today. Another repercussion of the lack of alternatives on the 
left might be a greater disconnect between voters with far left attitudes and the parties that are 
supposed to represent them, resulting in either indifference or alienation. 
These questions were explored in the second part. I found that while the same issues of 
the far left party family in Western Europe are important to its voters, no such overlap is present 
in the East. Though far left voters can be found furthest to the left on the ideological scale, their 
respective party family is closer to the center with the social democratic parties filling the void 
on the far left. Clearly the political choices offered by far left parties in the East are not effective 
since they do not follow their voters‟ preferences.  
Furthermore, voters of far left parties and voters of center left parties have similar 
opinions on the nation‟s economy and personal income as well as government involvement in 
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these matters. This might be the result of the obvious lack of distinct far left policy stances. If 
there is no political entity such as parties to openly discuss, support and pursue these issues, 
voters have a more difficult time to develop their own far left positions. After all, it is the parties 
function to express and offer choices.      
 An implication of the mismatch between party family and voters as well as the 
similarities between voters of different party families might be greater voter abstention on the far 
left which could not be tested for in the context of this paper, however. Should this turn out to be 
true, the alienation of parts of the electorate from the political process means problems for the 
legitimacy of governments in the East and a possible threat to democracy in the region.  
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Appendix A: Most Recent Election Results of Far Left Parties in Europe 
Country Votes 
Received in 
Percent 
Year Name of Party 
Austria N/A N/A N/A 
Belgium N/A N/A N/A 
Bulgaria N/A N/A N/A 
Croatia N/A N/A N/A 
Czech Republic 11.3 2010 Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia 
Denmark 2.2 2007 Unity List – the Red-Greens 
Estonia N/A N/A N/A 
Finland 8.8 2007 Left Alliance 
France 4.3 2007 French Communist Party 
Germany 11.9 2009 The Left 
Greece 7.5 / 4.6 2009 Communist Party of Greece / Coalition 
of the Radical Left 
Hungary N/A N/A N/A 
Iceland 21.7 2009 Left-Green Movement 
Ireland 1.2 / 1.0 2011 Socialist Party / People Before Profit 
Alliance 
Italy 3.1 2008 Rainbow Left 
Latvia N/A N/A N/A 
Lithuania N/A N/A N/A 
Luxembourg 3.3 2009 The Left 
Malta N/A N/A N/A 
Moldova 39.3 2010 Communist Party of the Republic of 
Moldova 
Netherlands 9.9 2010 Socialist Party 
Norway 6.2 2009 Socialist Left Party 
Poland N/A N/A N/A 
Portugal 9.8 / 7.9 2009 The Left Block / Democratic Unity 
Coalition 
Romania N/A N/A N/A 
Serbia N/A N/A N/A 
Slovakia N/A N/A N/A 
Slovenia N/A N/A N/A 
Spain 3.8 2008 United Left 
Sweden 5.6 2010 Left Party 
Switzerland 0.7 / 0.4 2007 Labor Party of Switzerland / Solidarity 
United Kingdom 0.1 2010  Respect Party 
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Appendix B: Distributions Scores 
 
 Market Economy Welfare 
West min  median  max  25%  75% min   median   max  25%     75% 
Communist 
 
0         .08      1.7      0     .7 10.0   18.0      37.8  11.0     23.1 
Social 
Democratic 
0         1.3     5.8      .8    2.6 5.0     17.9      38.0   13.0    20.9 
Green 
 
0          .5      2.4       0    1.0 10.1   17.4      29.8   12.4     18.3 
   
East   
Communist 
 
0.7       .9      3.4      .7    2.2 12.8   14.9     18.6    12.7     17.7 
Social 
Democratic 
0         1.9     4.5      .2    4.2  6.4      19.9        31.4        12.9     
27.0 
 European Integration 
West min  median  max  25%  75% 
Communist 
 
-9.4        0     8.1   -1.8   2.7 
Social 
Democratic 
-1.7       2.2   6.8    1.1   4.1 
Green 
 
-4.4       1.3   5.9   -1.0   2.3 
  
East  
Communist 
 
  0         1.8  11.1     .2    4.3 
Social 
Democratic 
  0         2.6    4.9    1.3   3.3 
 
 Left-Right Planned Economy 
West min   median  max   25% 75% min  median  max  25%   75% 
Communist 
 
-48.0  -26.7  -16.8 -34.2  -17.7 0       4.3       9.8    2.9     6.2 
Social 
Democratic 
-38.2  -18.3   8.4   -21.3  -8.5 .5      3.7      10.2   2.6     7.1 
Green 
 
-33.5  -19.2  20.0  -25.0  -13.6 .2      3.6       9.8    1.2     4.2          
   
East   
Communist 
 
-14.5   -6.3   -1.3  -11.9   -2.3 0       .8        5.6        0     3.6 
Social 
Democratic 
-22.8  -11.0   1.6   -21.8  -9.1 0     2.2        9.5        0     5.3 
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Appendix C: Difference Scores 
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Appendix D: Complete Tables of Multinomial Regression Outputs 
West 
 (Far Left) (Center Left) (Center Right) (Far Right) 
VARIABLES Baseline 2 3 4 
     
Left-Right  0.479*** 1.312*** 1.343*** 
  (0.0209) (0.0249) (0.0373) 
Satisfied w/ national economy  0.0457*** 0.0224 -0.0486 
  (0.0169) (0.0186) (0.0302) 
Satisfied w/ household income  -0.126*** -0.267*** -0.135 
  (0.0461) (0.0513) (0.0843) 
Gov’t involvement (income)  0.195*** 0.405*** 0.135** 
  (0.0394) (0.0423) (0.0638) 
European Integration  0.0645*** 0.00499 -0.196*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0147) (0.0241) 
Age  0.0111*** 0.0146*** 0.00150 
  (0.00226) (0.00247) (0.00393) 
Gender  0.0671 0.0424 -0.359*** 
  (0.0655) (0.0722) (0.119) 
Education  -0.0308*** -0.0100 -0.0604*** 
  (0.00851) (0.00950) (0.0160) 
Belgium  14.67 15.56 34.98 
  (840.5) (840.5) (1,737) 
Cyprus  -6.083*** -4.455*** -4.964 
  (0.525) (0.527) (2,966) 
Denmark  -4.862*** -5.128*** 15.30 
  (0.516) (0.524) (1,520) 
Finland  -3.874*** -3.788*** 14.97 
  (0.521) (0.527) (1,520) 
France  -3.358*** -3.307*** 15.69 
  (0.517) (0.524) (1,520) 
Germany  -3.455*** -3.219*** 14.22 
  (0.514) (0.519) (1,520) 
Greece  -4.249*** -4.866*** 14.00 
  (0.515) (0.523) (1,520) 
Ireland  13.78 15.95 15.29 
  (879.4) (879.4) (2,675) 
Netherlands  -4.440*** -4.441*** 15.14 
  (0.516) (0.521) (1,520) 
Norway  -4.191*** -4.089*** -3.708 
  (0.521) (0.528) (2,285) 
Portugal  -3.801*** -4.219*** -3.968 
  (0.521) (0.531) (2,433) 
Spain  -2.569*** -2.521*** 15.55 
  (0.525) (0.532) (1,520) 
Sweden  -3.033*** -3.070*** -2.736 
  (0.523) (0.530) (2,220) 
Switzerland  -0.820 -0.244 17.54 
  (0.717) (0.724) (1,520) 
Intercept  2.674*** -1.784*** -19.91 
  (0.578) (0.598) (1,520) 
Observations 17,085 17,085 17,085 17,085 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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East 
 (Far Left) (Center Left) (Center Right) (Far Right) 
VARIABLES Baseline 2 3 4 
     
Left-Right  0.134*** 0.707*** 0.681*** 
  (0.0469) (0.0471) (0.0519) 
Satisfaction w/ national economy  0.119** 0.0667 -0.0131 
  (0.0502) (0.0506) (0.0576) 
Satisfaction w/ household income  -0.0853 -0.119 -0.113 
  (0.126) (0.127) (0.144) 
Gov’t involvement (income)  0.148 0.238** 0.0745 
  (0.0951) (0.0955) (0.110) 
European Integration  0.101*** 0.0894** 0.00366 
  (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0420) 
Age  -0.0144** -0.0146** -0.0141* 
  (0.00661) (0.00660) (0.00738) 
Gender  0.164 0.0723 -0.361* 
  (0.188) (0.189) (0.215) 
Education  -0.0612* -0.0808** -0.0428 
  (0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0361) 
Bulgaria  -17.03 -17.15 -16.71 
  (2,253) (2,253) (2,253) 
Czech Republic  -19.88 -20.85 -41.54 
  (2,253) (2,253) (4,382) 
Estonia  -16.43 -15.16 -19.26 
  (2,253) (2,253) (2,253) 
Croatia  -0.309 -0.0595 -1.141 
  (3,363) (3,363) (3,363) 
Hungary  -15.47 -15.72 -18.74 
  (2,253) (2,253) (2,253) 
Latvia  -39.15 -19.03 -19.70 
  (2,548) (2,253) (2,253) 
Poland  -17.93 -15.73 -18.78 
  (2,253) (2,253) (2,253) 
Romania  -0.661 -0.456 -1.994 
  (2,938) (2,938) (2,938) 
Slovenia  -0.149 0.291 -0.245 
  (3,473) (3,473) (3,473) 
Intercept  21.16 19.16 19.00 
  (2,253) (2,253) (2,253) 
Observations 7,570 7,570 7,570 7,570 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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